Missing Children in North Caucasus

Window on Eurasia: ‘Missing’ Children in North Caucasus Part of Broader Problem with Russian Census, Moscow Demographer Says

Paul Goble

Staunton, March 29 – Reports that North Caucasus officials have “lost” more than 110,000 children they claimed in 2010 were residents of their republics are part of a broader problem in which officials there and elsewhere falsified census reports in order to suggest that the Russian Federation has “at a minimum” 2.5 million more people than it in fact does.

That is just one disturbing conclusions about the results reported by the 2002 and 2010 Russian censuses which Sergey Zakharov, the director of demographic research at Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, offered in the course of an interview posted online yesterday.

Because Russia, like many other countries, does not have a population register as such, Rosstat relies “above all” on data about “demographic events” like births, deaths, and marriages, and on censuses which the constitution requires be conducted every ten years, Zakharov notes. Unfortunately, there are many problems with such data, especially that from censuses.

“It is difficult to call the 2002 and 2010 censuses good,” the demographer continues, adding that he would give them a grade of  “C-Plus.” Among the worse problems manifested in them, he says, are the efforts by officials to report that their regions and republics have more residents than in fact they do in order to obtain larger subventions from Moscow.

Among the worst offenders in this regard are leaders in the North Caucasus, a fact that has been highlighted by official discovery that those leaders have somehow misplaced tens of thousands of children they claimed in 2010. But that region is far from the only one where official malfeasance boosted the overall numbers.

That region, Zakharov says, added one million to the real number, but it was closely followed by over-reporting in Moscow and St. Petersburg.  In those cities, many people refused to “open their doors” to census takers and the original count was quite low.  Then-Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov gave an order to use information contained in administrative registrars.

As a result, “many people were double counted” in the census, first by their census declarations and then by these alternative sources.  In 2002, this happened but it was illegal, Zakharov continues, but for 2010, “Rosstat completely legalized” that approach. “Otherwise, it simply couldn’t overcome the lack of willingness of the population to cooperate.”

Rosstat says that only 15 percent of the reported count in 2010 reflected the use of such alternative enumerations, “but we consider that the real figure is much greater.”

No country has ever conducted a perfect census, Zakharov says, but Russia’s problems with the collection of data mean that officials cannot come up with good policies except by accident because they do not have data about the population on which they can rely.  And both officials and demographers are aware of this.

One way to address it, he continues, is to conduct mini-censuses between those that embrace the entire country. The Soviet Union conducted one of these in 1985, and the Russian Federation plans to do one before the 2020 enumeration, focusing in particular on issues involving reproduction rates.

“The number of people born is increasing” in Russia, Zakharov says. “But whether this means an increase in the birthrate is a big question because it is no secret that Russia is at crest of a demographic wave,” in which the large generation of Russian women born in the 1980s is having children.

Indeed, it seems likely that “the average number” of children per woman “is not changing although the absolute number of births is increasing” because there are more Russian women now in the prime childbearing years of their lives.  When their number declines as it will, Zakharov says, so too will the number of births.

The Russian government’s pro-natalist policies, including “maternal capital,” are unlikely to change that, the demographer says. They may change when women have children but not how many.  To affect the overall number, he says, requires first of all “a struggle with poverty” and even a return to a more rural lifestyle, something which is unlikely to occur.

Russian women have a fertility rate of 1.6 percent, far below the 2.1 children per woman per lifetime needed to keep the population stable as well as below the 2.6 children per married couple per lifetime. Zakharov adds that “no more than 15 percent” of Russian women want three children or more, something far more would need to want to make a difference.

Consequently, expecting as some Russian officials do that they make the three-child family the norm or even more common is “completely utopian,” as the numbers show and as international experience confirms.

a year old respond to Putin's initiative

"... the authorities' wish to raise the birth rate is based on the idea that women and families want more children, but lack enough money and other resources to do so. So, the reasoning goes, if they are given apartments and more money, they will have more babies. There is no evidence to support this idea. Many countries in the world have higher living standards than Russia but the same or even lower fertility rates."

although the initiative is not a new born either

sourse: CS Monitor

if Latvia does not leap in births

demographer Ilmars Mezs

in the next three to five years. 

After these years there will be a new “demographic abyss” of new people; the number of fertile women in Latvia will drop dramatically and it will only be possible to prevent the extinction of Latvian people with birth rate level of Africa – something impossible to imagine for Latvia, Mezs said in an interview to LNT.
...
Mezs believes there are several solutions to this situation: increasing tax-free allowance for children, but not by some 10 LVL – by half. Also, the state could guarantee new families mortgage loans. The kindergarten issue is still unresolved as well.
...

When commenting the Economy Ministry’s re-immigration plan, Mezs admitted that it is good for such a plan to appear. Still, he believes it is not worth expecting an enormous flow of Latvians back to the country.

Ref: 102.109.109.6207 << really interesting ref ;)
at the same time some nations are growing with below replacement TFR

Dec 12: Putin population policy

About 15 minutes of the 1.5-hour address was devoted to the demographic situation. We managed to transcribe the speech and translated it into English to share with you below.

Mr. Putin expressed his conviction that in the future having 3 children per family should become a norm. This should be achieved through a range of financial benefits for families with 2nd and 3rd children, helping women reconcile family and work and improving lodging conditions for lower middle class families. While the President underlined many times that his Government will do its best to ensure that women’s needs are met when deciding whether to have a child (state solutions should be based on combatting the reasons that population does not want to have children), last (2011) year had seen a number of restrictions imposed to women’s access to abortion.

Full speech (1,5 hours):

Part on demography (14 minutes) :  (some parts are missing here and are available in the full speech)


(script of the speech translated from Russian below)

• By the beginning of the year 2000, the population of Russia was reducing by 1 million annually. It seemed impossible to stop this catastrophy.
• After the launch of demographic programmes the population of the country stabilised, starting from the year 2010 is started to increase. This is our key achievement.
• Stability is the main condition for developing and improving life conditions (and people believed the government!)
• For Russia to be sovereign and powerful - we have to be "more" and we have to be "better" in our morals, competences, work, creativity
• Today the rate of working population 20-40 years in Russia is the largest among the developed countries in the world. But in 20 years this number can decrease by 1,5 times. This tendency will continue if we do nothing. We have to open life opportunities for these generations: have interesting jobs, launch businesses, get housing, establish big and strong families, raise many children, be happy in their own country.
• Otherwise just in few decades Russia will become a poor, hopelessly old by age country, unable to keep its independence and even its territory.
• Demographic programmes adopted in last decade are working.
• Population not only stabilised but started to grow. In January- September 2012 population grew by 200 000 persons. 5 months in a row (first time ever in the newest history of the country) - we are registering a natural increase of population. Birthrates became higher than death rates.
• Life expectancy today has increased by 2,5 years (for the past 4 years) and is over 70 years now.
• We have adopted a programme of providing "Family capital" for the birth of the second child - it is successful. It will be in force till the end of the year 2016.
• But I do not want to push our women to the birth of the second child! Our women know themselves what and when  to do. But we need to inform our citizens. We also need to think what to do with this programme after year 2016.
• As of year 2013 we will start providing additional benefits for third and following children - in those regions, where demographic situation is worse than the country average. These are 50 Federation subjects: central, north-west, trans-Volga and far-East federal districts.
• Besides I remind all heads of Federation subjects the need to develop own programmes of demographic development.
• Demographers stress that choice of the second child represent a potential choice for the third child. It is important that the family takes this step.
• Although some experts that I respect are doubtful about it, I am convinced: the norm in Russia should be a family with 3 children.
• But to ensure this a lot needs to be done. We need to create favorable conditions first and foremost for women. So that they should not fear that 2nd and following child would close their way to careers and good jobs. That it would make them limited to household work. What we started to do is: solving the long queues to the kindergartens; professional trainings for women with children; supporting flexible form of employment  - this will directly affect the choice of family for the second child.
• High attention should be paid to under-school facilities including supporting private facilities. Many obstacles to that have already been removed. I (Putin) request to completely clear out obstacles in the first half of the next year. Regions need to work more: everywhere should be open small and 'home-based' kindergardens as well as after-school hours facilities. Parents should have choice for these facilities without queues and stress.
• lodging problems should be solved and mortgage should be available to lower middle class families (teachers, doctors etc.)

Source: Marina Davidashvili, Senior Policy Officer, EPF

including turning to the Virgin Mary for help

Over the course of 2011, this blog has from time to time drawn attention to the demographic malaise affecting Russia.  Shannon blogged back in April on the lack of men in that country and how alcohol addiction has played a large part in that problem.  Indeed, the decline in Russian population since the fall of the Iron Curtain has been simply remarkable and unprecedented – it was not without reason that the first international demographic summit was held in Moscow in June this year.  The Russian political leaders have tried to reverse their declining population, including turning to the Virgin Mary for help.
Now, in the latest issue of Foreign Affairs magazine, a world renowned demographer, Nicholas Eberstadt, has published a very informative article about Russia, entitled “The Dying Bear” (as you can imagine from the title, he does not envisage a very rosy future for Russia…) Unfortunately, the article is not available free online, so I can only link you to the opening few paragraphs and urge you to try and get hold of the article from somewhere.  In essence, Eberstadt argues that Russia is in trouble demographically due to its very high mortality rates.
The trouble is that Russia is a “net mortality society” – since 1992 (???), about 12.5 million more Russians have been buried than have been born.  Thus, since 1992 Russia’s population has fallen every year (except 1993 and 2010) and this decline has only been softened by immigration, mainly from former Soviet states.  Although Russia is not alone in the World in suffering population decline (Eberstadt points to Germany (earlier than Russia), Italy and Japan as countries that are about to enter into or are already in sustained population decline) the difference for Russia is that its health conditions are deteriorating, adding to already high death rates.  According to the Human Mortality Database, a research consortium, overall life expectancy at birth in Russia was slightly lower in 2009 than it was in Russia in 1961!  More shockingly, in 2009:

“…overall life expectancy at age 15 was estimated to be lower in Russia than in Bangladesh, East Timor, Eritrea, Madagascar, Niger and Yemen; even worse, Russia’s adult male life expectancy was estimated to be lower than Sudan’s, Rwanda’s, and even AIDS-ravaged Botswana’s.”

What is the cause of this terrible situation?  Apparently, it is due to:

“…an explosion (???) in deaths from cardio-vascular disease and what epidemiologists call ‘external causes’, such as poisoning, injury, suicide, homicide, traffic fatalities, and other violent accidents.”

Why Russia’s health is quite so bad though and why death rates are quite so high in an urbanized and literate, peacetime society is anyone’s guess.  “The brute fact is that no one understands why Russians are as unhealthy as they are.” (it's right;)
The Kremlin is not unaware of these facts and is trying to reverse this trend by introducing new public policies, including subsidies for mothers who have a second or third child.  Although these measures seem to have had some effect – birth rates have recently risen while death rates have decreased – there are some unavoidable features of Russia’s demographic future that will have to be overcome.  The first is that the recent birth slump has meant that there will be fewer potential mothers in the next few years:

“Women between 20 and 29 years of age bear nearly two-thirds of Russia’s babies.  In 2025, Russia is projected to have just 6.4 million women in their 20s, 45 percent fewer than today…[u]nder such circumstance, simply maintaining current national birth totals would require heroic upsurges in maternity.”

Added to this, Russia is getting older. By 2025, the proportion of the Russian population aged 65 years and older will have grown from 13 percent to almost 19 percent.  Thus, “[a]s a result of ageing alone, per capita mortality in Russia would rise by more than 20 per cent if nothing else changed.”
Taking all of this into account, “Russia is likely to remain a net mortality society for the foreseeable future”.  Russia’s federal statistics agency, Rosstat, envisions a cumulative total of deaths over births of between 4.7 and 9.5 million between 2011 and 2030.  The only way to forestall further depopulation is through massive immigration from abroad.  However, even this answer is not as complete as it once was.  Changes to education policies in former Soviet Union states means that immigrants from these countries are speaking less Russian than their parents did while Russian attitudes to immigrants has also grown less welcoming.
This is an excellent analysis by Eberstadt, but the one glaring omission in his piece is Russia’s obscenely high abortion rate.  Over a million abortions a year is surely a massive factor in Russia’s demographic decline!  Reducing this number would be one way to reduce the surfeit of deaths over births in Russia in the coming years.

read more about abortion's sources of population growth ;)